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Abstract: In this paper, we discuss Armstrong’s account of attachment-based claims 
to natural resources, the kind of rights that follow from attachment-based claims, 
and the limits we should impose on such claims. We hope to clarify how and 
why attachment matters in the discourse on resource rights by presenting three 
challenges to Armstrong’s theory. First, we question the normative basis for certain 
attachment claims, by trying to distinguish more clearly between different kinds of 
attachment and other kinds of claims. Second, we highlight the need to supplement 
Armstrong’s account with a theory of how to weigh different attachment claims so 
as to establish the normative standing that different kinds of attachment claims 
should have. Third, we propose that sustainability must be a necessary requirement 
for making attachment claims to natural resources legitimate. Based on these three 
challenges and the solutions we propose, we argue that attachment claims are on the 
one hand narrower than Armstrong suggests, while on the other hand they can justify 
more far-reaching rights to control than Armstrong initially considers, because of 
the particular weight that certain attachment claims have.
Keywords: attachment; sustainability; special rights; natural resources; life plans.
•
Introduction
Within the literature on territorial rights and resource rights, it is widely 
accepted that at least some attachment-based claims can ground rights to control 
particular resources. In his book Justice & Natural Resources, Chris Armstrong 
(2017: ch.5) offers a particular variant of this argument, which aims to show 
that certain attachment-based claims can be accommodated within a global 
welfare-egalitarian framework. Armstrong argues that (some) attachment-
based claims deserve special respect and attention when it comes to deciding 
who should control which natural resources (2017: 124). In this paper, we hope 
to clarify how and why attachment matters in the discourse on resource rights 
by presenting three challenges to Armstrong’s account. First, we question the 
normative basis for certain attachment claims, by trying to distinguish more 
clearly between different kinds of attachment and other kinds of claims. Second, 
we highlight the need to supplement Armstrong’s account with a theory of how 
to weigh different attachment claims so as to establish the normative standing 
that different kinds of attachment claims should have. Third, we propose that 
sustainability must be a necessary requirement for making attachment claims to 
natural resources legitimate. Based on these three challenges and the solutions 
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we propose, we argue that attachment claims are on the one hand narrower 
than Armstrong suggests while on the other hand attachment-based claims can 
justify more far-reaching rights to control than Armstrong initially considers, 
because of the particular weight that certain attachment claims have.
The paper is divided into six sections. Section One briefly introduces the idea 
of resource rights and explains how the idea of normatively relevant attachment 
claims entered the debate. While the precise role of attachment claims is 
controversial, the very idea that attachment is (at least sometimes) morally 
important is not. Section Two will introduce Armstrong’s (2017) account of 
resource rights and explain how it aims to accommodate attachment-based to 
control over natural resources. As will become clear, Armstrong’s account is 
marked by an internal tension, as Armstrong is worried about unduly giving 
weight to attachments that stem from the status quo that may very well be unjust 
or stand to protect mere preferences. This tension leads Armstrong to adopt 
an overly vague and possibly dangerous position with regard to the normative 
weight we assign to different forms of attachments. Section Three will present our 
first challenge to Armstrong’s argument by investigating what exactly we mean 
by attachment and how we can distinguish it from mere preferences. Based on 
the definition of attachment we propose, Section Four will provide an argument 
for why attachment theorists need to carefully develop a theory of how to weigh 
different attachment claims, so as to establish the kind of normative standing 
that different kinds of attachment claims should have. Without such a theory, 
Armstrong’s account runs into a serious problem, especially if Armstrong were 
to stick to his original account of attachment. Section Five will deal with our 
third and final challenge to Armstrong’s view, namely, that Armstrong’s theory 
overlooks one important value for assessing the legitimacy of attachment 
claims: sustainability. As we will argue sustainability should be considered a 
necessary aspect of all legitimate attachment-based claims to control over 
natural resources. Overall, we aim to offer a friendly, yet important, critique 
of Armstrong’s account. If our arguments are correct, Armstrong needs to re-
consider his definition of attachment, address the issue of normative hierarchies 
of attachment claims, and incorporate sustainability into his theory of how 
attachment generates rights, in order to make it as convincing as possible.
ONE: Resource Rights and the Importance of Attachment Claims
The recent normative literature on rights to natural resources developed – at 
least in part – out of the literature on territorial rights (Kolers, 2012; Moore, 
2015; Nine, 2013). In fact, within the literature, it is widely accepted that 
resource rights and territorial rights partially overlap (Nine, 2016). As we will 
explain below, the idea of attachment as grounding relevant normative claims 
also comes from the literature on territorial rights. 
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According to the existing literature, resource rights can be held by a variety of 
agents and on the basis of a range of justifications. Moore (2015), for instance, 
argues that based on the value of collective self-determination peoples can claim 
not just a right to territorial control, but also the right to control the natural 
resources found in that territory. Nine (2012), meanwhile, argues that justice-
promoting collectives can justify control over natural resources via a collective 
account of Lockean property rights. On top of that, there are individualist 
Lockean arguments (Simmons, 2001), Kantian (Stilz, 2009; Ypi, 2012), and 
nationalist (Miller, 2012) accounts of who can claim under which circumstances 
rights over particular natural resources.
What virtually all existing theories of resource rights have in common is 
that they see resource rights as a bundle of rights, and hold the view that even 
if a party has a right to control certain natural resources, that control must 
not always be absolute. In fact, many existing accounts critically challenge the 
doctrine of ‘permanent sovereignty’ over natural resources, which is enshrined 
in international law (Armstrong, 2015; Mancilla, 2015; Schuppert, 2014).1 One 
reason for doing so is that to give full control over all the natural resources 
found in a particular territory to group X might conflict with the demands of 
global and social justice (Armstrong, 2015). Therefore, before one can allocate 
control over resources to particular groups, one first needs to be clear about 
the kinds of rights that make up the bundle of resource rights. As Armstrong 
(2017: 22-23), building on Ostrom (2000), observes, resource rights include at 
least four first-order rights as well as four further second-order rights. These 
are: access, withdrawal, alienation, and to derive income, as first order rights, 
as well as exclusion, management, regulation of alienation, and regulation of 
income, as second order rights. Again, not all rights of the rights bundle need to 
be held by the same agent. In fact, it is fairly common for certain agents to have 
only one or two of the associated rights, whether that is shareholders (who only 
have the right to derive income and to attend shareholder meetings), swimmers 
in a public lake (who only have the right to access and to derive a non-rival 
benefit), or trustees (who have the right to manage and exclude). The problem 
is that quite often several agents will have competing and overlapping claims to 
certain natural resources. Allocating resource rights thus requires disentangling 
these various claims, assessing their validity, and seeing how they relate to the 
demands of justice.
It is this disentanglement of resource rights and the assessment of resource 
claims with regard to the demands of justice to which Armstrong’s book 
1   For an alternative interpretation of sovereignty over natural resources, based on decolonisation and self-determination, 
see Gümplova (2020). 
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makes an important contribution, to wit, by advancing an individualist, global 
welfare egalitarianism that forces us to re-think the distribution of resources 
and resource rights above and below the territorial state. However, because 
Armstrong’s theory primarily cares about the equal access to well-being 
of individuals globally, there is a worry that his theory might not be able 
to accommodate the particular claims of individuals and communities to 
particular resources. The idea that so-called attachment-based claims play a key 
role in explaining why particular agents should control a particular territory, or 
why an agent might have special claims with regard to a particular resource, has 
been a cornerstone of the debate on territorial rights and resource rights (Kolers, 
2012; Nine, 2013; Moore, 2014). As Cara Nine (2018: 1) points out, attachment 
can serve different functions. One is that it can offer an explanation as to why 
agent X should control resource Y (i.e., the particularity question), by pointing 
at the physical attachment of X to Y. As we will see, this reading of attachment is 
incompatible with Armstrong’s normative account of attachment, and it is one of 
the issues that pushes Armstrong into making some controversial assumptions. 
Alternatively, attachment can be used to ‘ground rights over resources on the 
close relationship which some agents have formed with specific resources’ 
(Armstrong, 2017: 113), that is, because a resource is central to an agent’s life 
plan or an agent’s identity or some other normatively significant feature of the 
agent’s wellbeing. It is this kind of attachment claim that generates resource 
rights based on a relationship between agent and resource that Armstrong is 
interested in. So we will now turn our attention to the arguments Armstrong’s 
presents in his book.2 
TWO: Armstrong on Attachment
Armstrong defends a cosmopolitan theory of distributive justice in which 
resources are ‘tremendously important but nothing special’ (2017: 81) for 
achieving human wellbeing. Resources must, therefore, be distributed globally 
in so far as this promotes the equalisation of wellbeing globally. However, this 
does not mean that all resources are simply divided into equal piles for each and 
every individual. While this would simply be impossible with some resources, it 
would also ignore the fact that some particular natural resources are of special 
importance to some particular agents. This is where attachment comes in. In 
some circumstances, Armstrong (2017: 116) suggests, according control over 
some resources by taking them away from the pool of resources to be distributed 
globally achieves the goal of equal wellbeing more effectively and fairly. The 
basis for doing so are attachment claims. So what exactly does this mean?
2   Chapter 5 in Armstrong’s book draws heavily on Armstrong’s (2014) earlier article on ‘Justice and Attachment to 
Natural Resources.’ While there are some minor differences between both accounts, we will focus on Armstrong’s 
explanations in his more recent book as we take this to be his more considered view.
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As cited earlier, for Armstrong (2017: 113) attachment is about ‘the close 
relationship which some agents have formed with specific resources.’ According 
to Armstrong (2017: 113) attachment claims are special claims that ‘seek to 
ground rights over resources.’ However, Armstrong is extremely vague on 
whether all special claims ground rights to resources, or just some, or whether 
other conditions need to be fulfilled in order to turn a special claim into a right. 
Armstrong (2017: 124) simply states that ‘rights claims’ are ‘implicit in many 
special claims,’ which contributes to the ambiguity of his account. In both his 
journal article from 2014 and in his book, Armstrong clearly does not see the 
need to further explain the move from claims to resources based on attachment 
to rights over resources, presumably because he thinks this transition is rather 
seamless. As he (2017: 119) puts it, his aim is to put forth an attachment-
based account that produces ‘direct claims over natural resources,’ with direct 
claims being specified as ‘a claim which states that a specific agent has a 
prima facie claim to control, securely access, or constrain others’ access to a 
specified resource simply because of some feature of her relationship with that 
resource’ (2017: 118). What attachment claims ground then may be some or all 
of the rights found in the large bundle of resource rights described above. For 
Armstrong (2017: 117), attachment claims are about the promotion of wellbeing 
through particular goods and resources, and they are normatively relevant for 
the establishment of special claims when either a resource is needed by the 
individual for the pursuit of her life-goals (2017: 18), or more generally a special 
relationship exists between an agent and a specific resource. So, what exactly 
qualifies as a special relationship? 
In order to understand Armstrong’s account of attachment, one first needs to 
understand which issues Armstrong wants to avoid. First, Armstrong is keen to 
present a theory that does not suffer from status quo bias, understood as giving 
preference to those agents which currently control specific resources, since this 
state of affairs might well be morally unjustifiable. Therefore, Armstrong argues 
that the scope of attachment is not restricted to resources an agent already 
controls. Second, Armstrong is worried about theories, such as Avery Kolers’ 
(2012) account, which use attachment claims to irreversibly close off resources. 
Hence, Armstrong thinks that the fact that an agent’s identity is entwined with 
a particular resource is not enough to give absolute control over that resource 
to this agent. Third, Armstrong is worried about having an intellectual bias in 
favour of plan-based attachment in his account (2017: 118) Thus, attachment is 
not restricted to cases in which an agent has built life-plans around a particular 
resource, but also non-plan-based attachments can ground normatively 
relevant claims. In other words, all three of these worries drive Armstrong to 
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adopt a wide theory of attachment, which ultimately leads to problems as we 
will discuss in section three. 
While attachment claims come for Armstrong in a myriad of different forms, 
it is interesting that the key examples in his book chapter are cases of deeply 
held attachments, whether it is the Hindu who lives his life with the expectation 
that his ashes will be scattered on the Ganges, or a member of the Saami whose 
way of life relies on the availability of herding grounds to continue pursuing the 
reindeer herding tradition of her people. When access to a particular resource 
contributes to the individual’s wellbeing, attachment can establish rights to 
undisturbed access to, for example, herding grounds or to scattering ashes on a 
river. This way, the Hindu and the Saami will be able to preserve their interest 
against the demands of global redistribution. 
In the Saami case, Armstrong suggests that, where the protection of the 
practice requires substantive involvement of the agent in the management of 
the resource, the Saami may acquire a share in management, allowing them to 
participate in the decision-making process regarding the use and exploitation 
of the herding grounds (Armstrong, 2017: 136-138). The representatives of 
the Saami people will thus have a right to sit with other governing bodies at 
the negotiating table when decisions about protecting and managing access to 
herding grounds are being made. They will also have a right that the interest of 
the people they represent are taken into consideration, and possibly that the 
outcome of the collective decision promotes the sustainability of the herding 
grounds. However, Armstrong (2017: 135) is quick to stress that attachment 
claims normally cannot accord to one agent exclusive control over a resource, 
since most attachment claims simply require that either a resource is preserved 
or continuous access with non-subtractive benefits granted.
While most of the examples which Armstrong discusses focus on resources 
integral to people’s life-plans, his account of legitimate attachment claims 
is much wider than it initially appears. By recognising that non-plan based 
attachment can also give rise to normatively relevant attachment claims, 
Armstrong opens the door to a wide variety of attachment based special rights. 
Armstrong (2017: 117) first observes that a person ‘might derive considerable 
satisfaction from visiting a forest,’ which, according to Armstrong, is enough 
to ground a morally relevant special claim, as long as the resource in question 
is ‘specifically valuable’ and not ‘substitutable.’ However, Armstrong goes even 
further, claiming that even the person who simply knows of the existence of 
a particular resource but who has no plan to ever travel to see the resource 
(such as a beautiful mountain on another continent) may have a normatively 
significant demand, as long as their well-being would be gravely affected by 
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the loss or destruction of this resource. As Armstrong (2017: 118) suggests, 
‘these facts [i.e., that a person feels passionately about the existence of a far 
away resource] ought to be reckoned with whenever decisions are made about 
whether a particular resource is used (or indeed destroyed).’
What does it mean that the fact of non-plan based attachment ought to be 
reckoned with? What kind of claim and corresponding right does a person who 
likes a far away resource have? Armstrong is vague in this regard. He writes: ‘There 
seems to be no principled reason for focusing on plan-related manifestations 
of attachment alone, to the exclusion of non-plan-related versions. […] Both 
facts [i.e., plan based and non-plan based attachment], it seems to me, can 
be normatively significant’ (2017: 118). What is worth remembering though 
is that Armstrong discusses cases of a person simply deriving ‘satisfaction 
from knowing that it [the specific resource that a person claims attachment 
to] exists’ with no plan to ever travel there, on the very same page on which 
he unequivocally states that his account is about establishing direct claims to 
natural resources. We should, therefore, take Armstrong’s expansion of the 
scope of attachment seriously.
THREE: Understanding Attachment: Forms of Attachments and 
Distinguishing Attachment from Mere Preferences
Claims from attachment play an important role in the literature on territorial 
rights and resource rights. However, there exist a variety of competing 
conceptions of what it means and what kind of conditions must hold for agents 
to be able to claim an attachment to a particular territory or resource based on 
their close relationship to the resource. Stilz (2011: 334) for instance suggests 
that individuals acquire occupancy rights on a particular territory when this 
is of ‘central importance for an individual’s life-plans and projects.’ Simmons 
(2001: 312) on the other hand bases territorial and resource rights on a Lockean 
account of property that accords rights to individuals that put these resources 
at the centre of their self-preservation and self-government. Kolers (2009: 
67) instead proposes that groups displaying shared conception of land and 
resources coupled with distinctive, dense, and pervasive land-use practices 
collectively establish a morally significant attachment to the territory. In 
this section, we will try to define more closely what attachment is and how 
we can distinguish it from other, similar-looking claims, such as voicing a 
preference for one state of affairs over another and having one’s wellbeing 
affected if that preference is frustrated by others. Doing so, will allow us to see 
the flaws in Armstrong’s wide conception of attachment with its exclusive focus 
on individual wellbeing. In section four, we will raise the issue of attachment 
hierarchies and assessing the moral forcefulness of different attachment claims. 
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In addition, we will suggest that not all attachment claims are valid, as there 
are certain conditions which an attachment relationship must fulfil in order to 
be legitimate. In section five, we will make the case that sustainability is one of 
these conditions.
Let us start by tackling Armstrong’s controversial claim that attachment does 
not need to depend on any of the following: control, centrality to life-plans, or 
being identity-forming. As you might recall, Armstrong (2017: 118) held that 
the mere fact that an agent deeply appreciates the existence of a resource and 
that they would be saddened if the resource were to be destroyed or irreparably 
changed is enough to generate an attachment claim. However, appreciation and 
attachment are not the same. 
Take the following example: imagine a person P who derives satisfaction 
from knowing that the mountain Annapurna I in Nepal exists, and that P, who 
appreciates the beautiful south face of Annapurna I, would be deeply saddened if 
they learned that Annapurna I had been destroyed because the local population 
had decided to engage in some kind of drilling. If this fact is enough to give P a 
normatively relevant claim in what happens to Annapurna I, it would look quite 
different from the kind of attachment claims the literature normally considers. 
Compare P’s case with the case of N, a local living in the foothills of Annapurna 
I, who has actually seen Annapurna I, who knows that Annapurna is named after 
the Hindu goddess of food and nourishment and who – as so many people in the 
Annapurna region – feels deeply connected to the Annapurna and worships it 
for its supply of fresh, clean water, even though N does not actually believe that 
the goddess lives on Annapurna I.
There are at least two ways of looking at this example: one could maintain 
that both P and N are in normatively relevant ways attached to Annapurna 
I and that all we have to do is to find a way to assess and compare their 
respective claims. This will be discussed in section four. The second option is 
to state that there is a clear qualitative difference between P’s and N’s claims. 
While N seems to have a proper attachment to Annapurna I, P simply has an 
appreciation for Annapurna I, which leads P to have strong preferences with 
regard to how Annapurna I should be managed. Following Reibold (2019), we 
would argue that attachment proper needs to fulfil one of three functions in 
order to be considered the source of normatively weighty claims: it either needs 
to be identify-defining, purpose- or meaning-giving, or connected to a feeling 
of belonging and thus life-structuring.3 Defining attachment in this way maps 
3   Reibold (2019) uses slightly different labels, namely, cultural, activity-based and social attachments, but she mentions 
the same kind of considerations. Reibold distinguishes these three normatively relevant forms of attachment from 
economic attachment, the nature of which is purely instrumental in that a resource might be a means to secure one’s 
income, but in this regard more easily substitutable than the other three benefits that stem from attachment.
GLOBAL JUSTICE : THEORY PRACTICE RHETORIC (13/1) 2021 
ISSN: 1835-6842
58
ATTACHMENT, SUSTAINABILITY, AND CONTROL  
OVER NATURAL RESOURCES
onto the existing attachment debates in the literature, and it is also the kind of 
attachment that Armstrong himself uses in his more detailed discussions.
The problem with extending the scope of attachment in the way that Armstrong 
does, is that it loses normative force. If we allow any appreciative preference 
to count as an attachment, the very claim that one has an attachment to a 
particular resource becomes normatively uninteresting, which is the opposite 
of what Armstrong wants. To put it differently, to treat all likes and preferences 
to be in principle comparable with deeply held and over a long period of time 
cultivated connections with resources that play a crucial role in an agent’s way 
of life seems to trivialise attachment proper.4 What we have here is not just a 
difference in degree, but also a difference in quality.
Armstrong himself uses much more forceful language when explaining 
to his reader why attachment matters, and it is only when dealing with the 
three aforementioned worries that he extends the scope of attachment too far. 
Armstrong (2017) speaks of the ‘profound connection between an individual’s 
identity and her ability to securely interact with a specific natural resource’ 
(121) or of resources being ‘hugely significant to particular people’s sense of 
agency’ (122). Describing attachment in this way nicely fits with our account 
that resources one is attached to either need to be identity-defining, purpose- or 
meaning-giving, or connected to a feeling of belonging and thus life-structuring. 
Moreover, Armstrong can more effectively address the issue of status-quo bias 
by drawing on Reibold’s (2019) excellent work on supersession, in which she 
convincingly argues that current control in and of itself neither suffices to ground, 
nor is a necessary condition for attachment. For some people, in fact, a resource 
can still be meaning-giving, even if they lost control over it, which is something 
that has happened repeatedly to indigenous groups especially in the context of 
colonialism and European imperialism.5 Similarly, in order to avoid intellectual 
bias in one’s theory of attachment, one does not need to throw the baby out 
with the bathwater: instead of including all satisfaction-giving preferences, one 
should simply highlight that feelings of belonging can be a kind of attachment, 
too. One does not need to have a plan to have a morally relevant attachment, 
4   The concept of attachment would lose normative force in the same way the concept of harm would if it was defined 
as a setback of interests, and interests were defined as any kind of morally non objectionable preferences, desires 
and hopes (Feinberg, 1983; Raz, 1986). If harm is any setback of interests, Annie harms Bob by not sitting next to 
him in cafeteria, simply because Bob wanted Annie to sit next to him. If this is the case, the notion of harm becomes 
normatively irrelevant: nothing normatively significant follows from the fact that Annie harmed Bob.
5   Our claim here is that attachment requires a proper connection to the resource in question, but that this connection 
might have been threatened, altered, or even severed in recent times, so that attachment cannot be the privilege of 
those who control and own resources. Two caveats apply to this last observation: first, the change in the connection 
cannot have been too long ago, since otherwise the old connection will have been superseded; and second, the change 
in connection cannot have occurred entirely voluntary. In fact, in most cases it seems that some form of injustice must 
have occurred in changing this deep and longstanding connection between humans and resources, in order to get a 
successful attachment claim off the ground.
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but it is also not good enough to simply derive satisfaction from something in 
order to be able to claim a right to access a resource, or some other right to it. In 
short, Armstrong does not need to stretch his account of attachment so thinly 
to avoid the status quo and intellectual bias. On the contrary, a wide account 
of attachment results in the obscuration of the difference between normatively 
important attachment and mere preferences.
Having challenged Armstrong’s extension of attachment, let us now turn to 
the second issue raised above, namely that even if P’s connection to Annapurna 
I did count as relevant attachment, and not as a mere preference, how could we 
assess and compare it with N’s attachment to Annapurna I?
FOUR: Assessing the Moral Urgency of Attachment Claims 
One key omission in Armstrong’s entire account is that it lacks a theory of 
how to weigh different attachment claims. One reason for this surprising gap 
might be that Armstrong implicitly assumes that many attachment claims are 
compatible with each other. Armstrong, for instance, sees no problem with 
his extension of attachment to mere appreciation cases, because in cases of 
appreciation ‘attachment is likely to be best respected simply by allowing the 
resource in question to continue to exist’ (2017: 124). If we apply this to the 
Annapurna case, this solution indeed works nicely as P’s attachment claim can 
be translated into a duty to conserve Annapurna I, which is something N also 
wants, because of N’s attachment to Annapurna I. However, it is fairly clear that 
not all attachment claims might be compatible, so the question is what happens 
when two competing attachment claims meet, in particular if both are cases of 
attachment proper.6
There are two ways in which we could interpret the normative significance of 
different kinds of attachment. The first is that all attachment claims carry the 
same normative weight. The second option is that different attachment claims 
may generate stronger or weaker rights to natural resources. 
The first option of valuing all attachment claims equally runs into obvious 
problems. Take the example of an Amazonian tribe A that holds a particular 
waterfall sacred, but makes no plan to use it. Imagine, that the particular 
waterfall is only one of many sacred sites in A’s home territory and that tribe 
A shares the waterfall with the neighbouring tribe B, which also attaches great 
value to the waterfall. The people of tribe B see the waterfall and its upper and 
lower waterway as the tribe’s lifeblood, which provides them with fresh water 
and food sources, and the constant sound of falling water is a common theme 
6   Having explained why we think appreciation is not the same as attachment proper we will – for the remainder of the 
paper – take it for granted that all cases of attachment we discuss are cases of attachment proper, that is, they need to 
be identify-defining, purpose- or meaning-giving, or connected to a feeling of belonging and thus life-structuring. 
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in tribe B’s stories and songs. Tribe B lives closer to the waterfall than tribe A, 
and the waterfall certainly plays in B’s culture and identity a more central role 
than in A’s. 
One day tribe A and B meet to discuss the future of the waterfall, since A wishes 
to build a dam on the river and waterfall to generate hydroelectric power, seeing 
the energy produced by the waterfall also as a gift from god that would support 
A’s agricultural activities. Tribe B, meanwhile, is not interested in using any 
hydroelectric power from the river and waterfall because they reject modern 
electricity. Which tribe’s claim takes precedence? 
In this example, it seems that the two attachment based claims can be 
reconciled only if A does not want to build a dam. A’s use of the waterfall as a 
site of worship is perfectly compatible with B’s close connection to the waterfall 
and using it as a source of food and water. However, as A proposes to support 
its members’ life-plans with the introduction of hydroelectric power, the claims 
seem incompatible. So what can be done?
If one simply holds that A’s and B’s claims are equally valuable the attachment 
claims theory fails to deliver a clear verdict on who should control which rights 
with regard to the waterfall. However, if we take our bearings from Armstrong 
and if we supplement his overly vague account with a theory of how to weigh 
different attachment claims, the situation looks quite different. A’s claim to the 
waterfall is certainly morally relevant, but the initial claim that the waterfall is 
a sacred site does only seem to generate fairly limited rights, such as a right to 
access the waterfall and to worship there. B’s claims are slightly more extensive: 
there is also a claim to a right to access, but also to a right to use water and fish, 
as well as possibly even a right that the waterfall is kept in such a state that its 
constant rumbling will continue to form the musical background to B’s cultural 
and social life. B seems to have in this case more extensive claims than A. But 
does this mean that A’s claims are normatively less important than B’s?
That depends on how one weighs the different attachment claims. Considering 
that Armstrong defends a welfare egalitarian view, one option would be to 
look at which group derives greater wellbeing from the resource. However, 
Armstrong (2017: 85) has good reasons to reject those kinds of calculations 
with regard to wellbeing, or to the efficiency with which different groups and 
individuals ‘convert’ a resource into wellbeing. If we assess the moral weight 
of attachment claims purely on the basis of who receives how much well-
being from a resource we would unduly (dis)advantage those with expensive 
tastes. Moreover, this approach may lead to a particular conception of efficient 
wellbeing maximisation trumping deeply held attachments, which would run 
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counter to the very idea behind Armstrong’s claim that attachment plays an 
important role in an egalitarian theory centred on individuals’ wellbeing. 
A better option is to look at the relationship between the attachment in 
question and the morally relevant interests that are protected and/or met 
through respecting said attachment, as well as the ensuing welfare. This way 
of weighing attachment claims highlights the fact that attachment claims are 
based on value statements, such as the importance of having a sense of home, 
or the value of being able to direct one’s life. These values can be traced back 
to morally important interests, or what is called in the literature fundamental 
interests (Schuppert, 2013; Dworkin, 1978; Raz, 1986). One can then use these 
fundamental interests and the values they protect, as well as the centrality of 
the attachment claim under consideration for realising those interests, as the 
appropriate normative yardstick for assessing the relative merits of different 
attachment claims (Reibold, 2020).
In other words, in a first step an agent’s claim is checked whether it is a proper 
attachment claim or just a case of appreciation. This question is answered by 
looking at the three core kinds of attachment mentioned earlier, including 
whether something is identity-defining, purpose- or meaning-giving, or life-
structuring. If X does have an attachment to Y, we have a pro tanto reason to 
grant X certain privileges vis-à-vis Y.7 The same is done with the claims of agent 
Z vis-à-vis Y. If both X and Z have proper attachment claims, we look at the 
kind of interest(s) and value(s) that the attachment relates to, as well as how 
central the attachment in question is to X’s and Z’s overall welfare. Doing so 
allows us to weigh different claims. In the Amazonian waterfall example, tribe 
B has a more central and more interests affecting claim than A, because A has 
access to many equally important sacred sites, and because A’s plan to build 
a dam is essentially an economic concern, and thus in principle substitutable. 
In this example, B’s attachment claim should outweigh A’s if the two become 
incompatible (since in the original situation they actually were compatible, both 
attachments could be satisfied).
FIVE: Sustainability as a Condition of Justified Attachment Claims
The aim of the previous sections was to push Armstrong’s account to a more 
coherent account of attachment. To achieve this, however, apart from the 
question of which attachment claim is morally weightier if the cases of conflict, 
we must also deal with the question of whether there are certain limits to non-
conflictual attachment claims. Armstrong already clarifies that attachment 
claims must be appropriately limited: the recognition of attachment claims and 
7  We thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing us to make this point clearer and to structure it in the way we do here. 
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corresponding rights must not deprive others of natural resources essential to 
the satisfaction of their basic human rights, and they should be constrained by 
a ‘broad egalitarian proviso’ according to which individuals may be allowed to 
appropriate more than others on the basis of their attachment to a resource, 
as long as this offsets inequalities that they are subject to in other areas (2017: 
124-125). These conditions ensure that no special claim based on attachment 
results in unequal opportunities for wellbeing, but they do not go far enough. 
There are two important issues which need to be addressed here. First, even 
though most people in the literature use the term resources, which has an 
instrumental ring to it, we should be mindful that trees, plants, non-human 
animals and soil are not just piles of stuff waiting to be consumed by human 
projects and ideas. Second; within an account of natural resource justice like 
Armstrong’s, the environmental basis for what humans can do and be is the very 
first thing that needs to be secured, since without it humans cannot achieve any 
wellbeing at all. This is where the idea of sustainability comes in. Sustainability 
acts as an important constraint on the rights and claims of different agents, 
whether it is states,8 indigenous or community groups, or individuals.9 
Sustainability as a legitimacy condition for attachment claims (and possibly 
most resource claims in general) does two things: it highlights the fact that 
only if most resources are handled sustainably will future human wellbeing be 
possible, and it serves as a reminder that there are hardly any isolated resources 
which do not also perform some kind of either ecosystemic or climate-systemic 
functioning. To look at resources as individual goods outside their ecosystemic 
context would be catastrophic for a theory of resource justice. 
Thus, any attachment claim to control a particular resource ought to be 
conditional on the agent in question performing their ecological duties. These 
include a duty to manage the resources sustainably and not to violate the basic 
rights of others, including their right to a healthy enough environment that 
provides them with the benefits of life-sustaining ecosystem services. The idea 
of each and every individual having a basic right to a healthy environment, or 
to a green future (Hiskes, 2009), or to the benefits of life-sustaining ecosystem 
services (Schuppert, 2012) has gained prominence over recent years, and with 
good reason. In the current context of anthropogenic climate change, massive 
environmental degeneration and unprecedented levels of biodiversity loss, any 
account of justice ought to be concerned with the very basic environmental 
conditions needed to sustain lives worth living on this planet. Hence, no 
8   On the idea that state sovereignty comes with a duty of environmental protection and sustainability see 
Odenthal (1998).
9   There exists a vast literature on the ideas of individual stewardship duties, duties of environmental citizenship and 
duties of environmental protection for individuals, e.g., Cranor (1985), Melo-Escrihuela (2008), Welchman (2012).
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attachment claim, and possibly even no resource right in general can be 
considered legitimate unless it can be shown that granting the right would not 
foreseeably contribute to the avoidable violation of people’s basic environmental 
rights. Therefore, sustainability ought to be a basic legitimacy criterion for any 
attachment claim.
How does the sustainability constraint operate if, for example, the 
transformation of a forest, or the mining of a mountain is vital to the life-plans 
of a community? Perhaps we are thinking of the Apuan Alps in Carrara, Tuscany, 
where the industry of mining white and grey marble is a source of identity for the 
locals since the renaissance times. A halt to those activities would result in the 
loss of a rich and long-lasting narrative from which those who pride themselves 
in producing traditional quality Italian marble derive wellbeing. Alternatively, 
imagine the deforestation of a particular area is central to the life plans of an 
increasingly prosperous section of the Brazilian population that is emerging 
from poverty. In this case, it is harder to reconcile the two interests and ensure 
that both kinds of attachment are respected.
The sustainability constraint would require that the marble extraction 
continues, only if it does not dramatically destroy the landscape or the integrity 
of the mountain range, and that deforestation happens only if replanting and 
eco-forestry are possible. If this is not possible, however, the attachment-based 
claims to control over natural resources would have to be rejected, since again – 
all things considered – while the attachment in question is a proper attachment, 
the right to control over natural resources that could follow from it is not morally 
justifiable, since unsustainable resource use should not be protected under a 
theory of global resource justice.
The sustainability constraint therefore allows us to give proper weight to any 
given attachment claim, while at the same time it allows us to identify when 
special rights, properly limited by basic human rights, the egalitarian proviso, 
and sustainability, can be granted.
Conclusion
If the arguments made above are correct, there are three key implications 
for theorists of attachment: first, attachment claims need to be narrower and 
limited to attachment that is identify-defining, purpose- or meaning-giving, 
or connected to a feeling of belonging and thus life-structuring, in order to be 
morally important enough to generate right to particular natural resources. Mere 
appreciation is not enough. Second, even if we recognize that attachment claims 
might only generate certain rights of the wider resource rights bundle, there will 
be cases where attachment claims conflict. In these cases, we should not look at 
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the amount of wellbeing the granting of an attachment claim generates, but we 
should consider the moral weightiness of the underlying interest. Third, in order 
to be legitimate, attachment claims need to fulfil a range of conditions, including 
the satisfaction of sustainability requirements. Sustainability, in conjunction 
with basic need satisfaction and compatibility with the requirements of justice, 
is a core requirement for any kind of attachment claim to be considered 
legitimate. We hope that these three insights help to further clarify how and 
why attachment matters in discourses over rights to natural resources.10
10   An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop ‘Resource Rights Within Planetary Boundaries’ held 
at the Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change, Berlin, in November 2018. For their 
helpful comments we are grateful to all the participants at the workshop, Kerstin Reibold, Hilkje Hänel, and two 
anonymous reviewers.
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